Bridging the Gulf: Education as Implementation Catherine B. King Professor of Education National University San Diego, California, USA This is an extension of a paper given by Catherine King at the The 24th Annual Fallon Memorial Lonergan Symposium, April 16-18th, 2009, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles. Originally published as The Gulf: Education as Implementation, Education as Implementation Blog, April 2009. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION General theme: Lonergan: A Review--What issues need to be addressed? Specific theme: Bridging the Gulf--Education as Implementation Introduction Let us begin from an understanding that Bernard Lonergan’s contributions to philosophy and theology (Insight: A Study of Human Understanding [1958 & 2000] was first published in 1958) are worth mediating to a larger audience—to the various fields of study, and to one’s personal life—namely, insight into insight and all of the ins-and-outs of personal self-appropriation-affirmation. By “larger” I mean an audience beyond "Lonergan scholarship” and beyond those who already are convinced of its import; and whether that conviction is based on uncritical belief, or on a set of developing direct and reflective insights. From that beginning, let us recall that in Lonergan Workshop 17, Fred Crowe writes: My hope is that by the end of this century the basic idea of the four levels will be part of our general culture; so much so that to explain them, and still more to prove them, will be quite boring. Pupils leaving primary school will be as familiar with this structure as they are with, say, the golden rule. (2002) If we are right about mediating Lonergan’s contributions, and if Dr. Crowe’s vision for education is to occur, then we who have found universal import in those contributions are charged with finding ways to bring Lonergan’s insights to a broader audience. It follows that if we are to be heard, then one of our entrances into the dialogue must be through the door of empirical-secular concerns, and particularly in the field of education. To do so, we will need to take general empirical method, at least as applied theory, as the central empirical basis and as the focus and object of our communications. Section I: The Gulf--Impediments to Communication With the above in mind, I suggest that at least six problems hinder teachers and writers (who recognize the importance of Lonergan’s work) from being heard: These hindrances are abbreviated here but developed further on a blogsite (King, 2009) and in the appendixes herewith. Our first hindrance is the marginalization of the human sciences from the natural and physical sciences in Western history, and of philosophy and theology from all—which, in turn, has led to a long-standing fragmentation of-and-in all knowledge fields, and in a good part of common discourse. Lonergan saw that the whole project of philosophy and theology needed to be re-thought from bottom to top, as it were, and in terms of the ongoing influences of the scientific revolution, both good and bad. In brief, first, that revolution exposed the question of knowledge and its connection to the truth-reality complex; and second, it laid bare the relationship of knowledge, etc., to doctrine and to the doctrinal, religious, and political authority of the day. As many of us here understand, to date, only Lonergan’s work has supplied us with the avenue for a newly differentiated metaphysics, and for a cohesiveness of persons and fields through his regard for thoroughly understanding what it is to understand …. For the brevity of this presentation, let us assume this movement of marginalization as Lonergan’s historical context and go on to some specifics of communicating Lonergan’s work from within that context (2009). (For further development of this section, See Appendix 1) The second hindrance, then, is the existence of various and divisive camps centered on name recognitions and on specific technical conceptualizations. We are talking about human studies--and because of the flow of philosophical meaning that has come “down” to us from the scientific revolution (Cartesian dualism, mechanism, relativism, etc.), we find “Lonergan” and other thinkers isolated as various camps of thought. Such camps emerge from the very variety of philosophical biases, viewpoints, and issues that Lonergan critiques in Insight through his call for self-reflection and in his notion of a self-appropriation-affirmation, and of transcendental method and its theory of knowledge, and through his treatment of those biases and counter-positions. (See Appendix 2) (Transcendental method is equivalent to what he means by general empirical method.) Our third hindrance flows from the first two: We can point to the difficulty of communicating a philosophical generalist’s writings to such disparate, autonomous, and fragmented fields (maintaining a camp won’t do), or to gaining an audience for comparative analysis of camp theory, including in philosophy itself. The difficulty manifests in a pervasive sense of arbitrariness and in multiple and diverse concepts that lack a language of equivalence, in meaning, and in methods; and, again, in the vast foundational differences that Lonergan gave treatment to in Insight (1958 & 2000--see particularly Chapter 14, The Method of Metaphysics). For our fourth hindrance, we can point to esoterica: Many of Lonergan's writings are quite technical and long, as they must be, considering that his target is not the objects of what he called extroverted consciousness (1958, p. 423; & 2000, p. 448), or mere logic and concept, but also readers’ self-reflective capacities and our full foundational development and corrective, especially from general bias or a disregard for theory. Here, however, and for our purpose of opening communication venues, we find a great gulf, and the major difficulty of connecting Insight, etc., not to mention Lonergan’s aim, with common discourse and experience, and-or with the philosophical capacity of undergraduate, or even high school students. One semester will not do, especially when we consider the full sweep of what Lonergan was trying--not to convey, but to bring about. (Hand a copy of Insight to a K-12 teacher, and see what happens.) Further, the writings often assume a basic understanding of science, mathematics, logic, and philosophy (and their terminologies) that many in a broader audience, whom we want to engage, do not have. In my own experience with teaching K-12 teachers, many are quite open-minded, critical, and astute; and they all care greatly for their students' development. However, many also are working from what Lonergan might recognize as an IN-sufficiently cultured consciousness. (See Appendix 3) For our fifth hindrance, we can point to Insight’s later chapters’ and to Method in Theology’s apparent limitation to a religiously oriented audience, or even to Christian and particularly Catholic theologians. Here, I do not criticize, diminish, or set aside the religious point of view, religious consciousness, or authentic religious conversion. Rather, I speak of a lack of distinction between (a) philosophical and (b) religious/theological aspects in Lonergan's writings and in much that has flowed from it since he graced us with his presence. Though Lonergan’s own interest is in the whole human quest--emphasize "whole," in today’s world, the oft-combining of philosophical and religious narrative can foster misunderstanding in a more secularly-grounded audience—and one who may see no difference between religious and theological discourse. (Note that the June 2009 Lonergan conference at Boston College is named: Collaboration--in the Year of St. Paul. Of course there is nothing inherently "wrong" with this title. However, for those who are averse to combining religious with academic or scientific pursuits, the combination is off-putting.) Many (in my experience) wrongly assume that a study of Lonergan’s work must begin in certain religious assumptions and, thus (apparently), and though remarkably intelligent, its writer begins uncritically from a prescribed belief, faith, doctrinal, ideological or, more remotely, from a from-above-downward or classicist set of views. If the critique were true, of course, by secular and critical-empirical/methodological standards, such arguments would rightly render Lonergan’s work irrelevant to all but the most devoted of religious followers. (See Appendix 4) We find our sixth hindrance squarely on the side of the individual reader. And with Lonergan, we know we must meet the reader where they are—but there lies the paradox. That is, as with many philosophical matters, the polymorphism of mind that Lonergan treats is itself an impediment to mediating his work to a larger audience. Those impediments are rooted: (1) in a lack of philosophical development; (2) in the stunning array of unconsciously inherited foundational “lenses” that emerge in unison with clear thought when prompted by philosophical discussion; and (3) in consciously appropriated but inadequately conceived views (given high treatment in Insight as biases and counter-positions). (See also Piscitelli's development of what he refers to as lower viewpoints [1985].) Further, these impediments are commonly held together tightly by what I call a foundational dogmatism--an aversion to self-reflection and an unwillingness to address one's own foundational viewpoints or lenses. Such lenses greatly influence our understanding of everything in our purview. However, a reflective and theoretical self-inspection of such lenses is presently missing from our common educational experience (in the United States, and in my experience of several educational venues). Or as Lonergan states, our suggested audience is rarely “very far from a set of assumptions that are neither formulated or scrutinized” (Lonergan, 1958, p. 416; 2000, p. 441). Generally stated, the assumption and sometimes-statement is: “My knowing already works for me, so why go into it?” Translated, such statements mean that general empirical method is already at work in the speaker; and one of the counter-positions, for instance, relativism, are next-up for killing the philosophical baby in its crib, as it were. The complaint, you might say, is inconsistency of thought, and you would be right. However, such is the case with the meaning of polymorphism of mind. (See Appendix 5) Conclusion to Part 1 For many reasons, then, many highly intelligent and well-meaning thinkers who may have neither “formulated nor scrutinized” their own sets of assumptions (e.g., teachers, where a treatment of general bias is particularly important), can miss being introduced to a body of work that provides a critical avenue for such scrutiny and formulation for themselves and for their students. Thus, our relatively isolated field of “Lonergan studies” suffers from briefly-put—the gulf--the lack of well-defined, secularly useful (empirically based), curriculum-development strategies drawn from Lonergan’s work and based in a clear pedagogical method for teachers, for students of philosophy in early study, for the renaissance reader, and for the open-minded specialist in any knowledge field and profession. Such strategies are needed, and are appropriate to departments of education--the only hopeful ground for methodological entrance into Kindergarten-12 applications. (See Appendix 6) Section II: The Caveat for Implementation I point to a disjunctive, then, between (1) an all-too-common need for philosophical development and guided self-correction, particularly in teachers who covertly pass down philosophical polymorphism to their students; and (2) an accessible pedagogical path to grasp a core of critically established insights drawn from Lonergan’s contributions to philosophy, and particularly to the philosophy of education. Though the religious question (not yet doctrine) does constitute the remote context of all study, it cannot be the beginning point of secular study. Here is the caveat, however. If done fully and well the philosophical journey is long, and cannot be otherwise (1958, p. xxiii; & 2000, p. 17). If so, such a disjunctive calls for a difficult but ever-present task on the part of we mediators: To present core but distinct aspects of Lonergan’s contributions to differentiated and varied audiences and venues in relatively abbreviated format--however, (and this is the hard part) to do so without telescoping the philosophical journey or without vulgarizing Lonergan’s or others’ associated work—without cutting them to pieces and leaving the essentials behind--without missing the point that recovering such a core needs to be “painstaking and slow” for each person; and that such a recovery is central to the history of philosophy, to the sciences and humanities and to education for the “common culture” (Lonergan, 1958, p. xxiii & p. 544; & 2000, p. 17 & p. 568). (In today’s environment, I fear to say “liberal education” for the common culture.) Further, in the Preface to Insight, Lonergan says that, if we are to build a whole ship or a philosophy, “incompleteness is equivalent to failure” and, “against the flight from understanding half measures are of no avail” (1958, p. xiv; & 2000, p. 7). Again, he suggests a long and comprehensive journey. And as Hugo Meynell related over coffee earlier in our conference here, Fred Crowe has remarked that: if you are doing Lonergan briefly, you are not doing Lonergan. Also, Phil McShane quotes Lonergan as saying: “I can’t put all of Insight into two weeks of talk” (McShane, 2009). Nor should we think we can do so, or in one three-month course, in equivalent fashion. The distinction: In my own journey into method and language (Piscitelli, 1977), I found a neat, relatively brief, pedagogical-experimental connection between (1) the reader’s experience of language and (2) conscious structure. However, the same problem of adequate presentation still hovered for years and needed to be worked out. The insight that finally emerged was this: To mediate to education what Lonergan means by self-appropriation-affirmation with any hope of maintaining its relationship with what must be “painstakingly slow,” I needed to distinguish (1) a shorter philosophical journey (my original insight of offering a brief experimental connection) from (2) a longer philosophical journey (foundational development and corrective, or what Lonergan and others are trying to convey in writings like Insight—see 2000, pp. 422-23, & 1958, pp. 397-98;). So, half of the problem was to define the problem clearly. The Treatment Making the distinction between the two journeys allowed the problem of two different but related treatments to emerge: I had to find a way to (1) isolate the central briefer experiment while (2) making the experimenter aware of, and maintaining a clear and constant invitation to, experience those potential deeper philosophical insights—only afforded by the longer journey. To fail in this communication of a proper distinction-in-relation would be to telescope and vulgarize--like building half-a-ship, or like planting a tree in poor soil—the ship will not float, and neither tree nor experiment will flourish. Indeed, if the experiment is to flourish I must make clear the longer journey in the shorter. I must make clear the richness and complexity of the writing from which the shorter journey is drawn (Insight, etc.). First, I must constantly convey the potential for much further personal development and self-reflection with regard to reader foundations. Second, within that context, I must convey a need for self-knowledge and the self-correction that can follow with regard to the experimenter’s philosophical inheritance (i.e., biases, counter-positions, attitudes, etc.). And third, I must mirror the need for new development--of distinctions and interrelationships forged from an apprehension of theory, of a theory, and of those theoretical insights applied critically to that longer self-reflective journey. In other words, the text and teaching must convey what I am referring to here as an understanding that the shorter journey can deliver scientific-to-personal exploration and critical verification of a theory of mind (it can--the Finding the Mind classroom text affords this shorter journey.) However, it also must convey that the longer journey awaits us all and goes beyond--to include major internal change, foundational development and self-correction, a treatment of the flight from understanding, and what Lonergan refers to as a heightening of your own rational self-consciousness around various deeply felt but now fully conscious and critically known experiences—or in a word, comprehensive and critically established self-knowledge. As an historical aside, let us recall Plato’s setting out the difference between Socrates (1) as teacher, which he disclaims, and (2) as midwife, which he claims for himself, the philosopher. In terms of the shorter journey, the teacher can teach about self-appropriation-affirmation; and we can even take readers through a critically established process pointing to the remote but clearly present basic structure and set of operations within the self—all in a scientific-objectivist way. However, the philosopher-as-midwife is involved in what I am referring to as the longer journey. Here, the philosopher assists the seeker-person through various deeply felt, but no less critical, developments and corrections—or to use the midwife metaphor, the philosopher helps birth someone into the philosophical life—though, as Socrates knew, stillbirths always can occur in the birthing process. (See Appendix 7) Of course, Lonergan himself was involved with the longer journey, which includes the shorter. Whereas teaching to the shorter journey without midwifery into the longer journey defines what he and McShane refer to as a vulgarization of his work and of philosophy; and I would add of education in general. And this brings us to a seventh hindrance, which is specific to education. In that sense, much of what goes by the name education in the USA, especially in K-12, is more of a vulgarization of the educative experience (often rightly defined but not as often practiced in education circles as a “leading out”) than it is an increase-in or a deepening-of spirit that education in the fullest sense can be and, I with many others argue, should be. So introducing such work to the field of education is fraught with the same problems as mediating to individuals, only here, and though much open-mindedness can be found, the problems and omissions have become institutionalized. (See Appendixes 6 and 7) Section 3--The Project Finding the Mind--Pedagogy for Verifying Cognitional Theory/ Experimental Primer for Foundational Review and Self-Appropriation-Affirmation Thus, I undertake the task of distinguishing and writing specifically for the shorter and then longer journeys, for the sake (1) of approaching a broader audience of readers than Lonergan’s or many others’ bodies of work presently attract; and (2) of providing a critical introductory foundational text for education, for personal development and for philosophy and, with some adjustments, for the humanities and other departments of learning where foundations are of interest. Both are offered with the reader’s autonomy-of-choice in mind in the matter of taking on more pervasive philosophical studies though, of course again, I heartily recommend such a journey. And so the experiment as written—Finding the Mind--is an introduction to, but not a proffered short-cut to, a philosophical education. The text is divided into a Preface, an Introduction and two basic parts: First, as structure, at the front of the book are the chapters that guide the reader methodically through the experiment as the shorter journey. The second section is constituted by several appendices treating various philosophical issues that are touched on, but not developed well in the experiment, e.g., self-presence, the pervasiveness of the good, objectivity, knowledge and deriving ought from is, etc. More covertly, the text conditions the reader for the different conversions, especially for what Lonergan refers to as intellectual conversion. To avoid the term conversion and its "baggage," let us refer to the experience as foundational insights as distinct from informational insights. Foundational insights change the ground for all informational insights and open new horizons for us with regard to everything we think, say, and do. Thus, generally speaking, the layered structure of the text mimics the layered structure of internal meaning: Experiment (Layer 3) Appendixes (Layer 2) References to core philosophical texts(Layer 1) Extroverted Consciousness (Layer 3) Foundations (polymorphic or not) (Layer 2) Basic-given (fundamental) Structure (Layer 1) The appendixes, then, provide a bridge--or access to a deeper layer of potential self-reflection—reader foundations (layers 2). They are meant to inspire the reader’s potential for taking that longer philosophical, and perhaps spiritual, journey; whereas participating in the experiment can only take us on a critical-scientific, but relatively “extroverted” tour of the philosophical journey; hence its name: The shorter journey. (In my experience in the classroom, though the verification of the theory is secured by all, the event of "finding the mind" varies with the specific situation of the student--or, "where they are" presently in their philosophical state of affairs.) Such an abbreviated experiment alone, then, can introduce the reader to, but cannot take us through, that longer journey of interior development and corrective that is meant to occur by the use of a moving viewpoint in Insight—the journey that, at times, is known to momentarily unsettle us and, at times, even turns us upside down in our heads. “… and one has not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its startling strangeness …” (1958, p. xxviii; 2000, p. 22). In turn, that journey is recursive--it will eventually lend a newly understood quality to the briefer experiment, and to its singular purpose of readers personally verifying the theory and of finding and verifying the basic structure and activities of their own mind, albeit if only in a critical-objectivist and scientific sort of way. Furthermore, mediation includes a twofold pedagogical task: First, we need to quickly gain and hold reader-interest (and student-interest for teachers), in this case, for mediation into the field of education. … the method of metaphysics is primarily pedagogical: it is headed towards an end that is unknown and as yet cannot be disclosed; from the viewpoint of the pupil, it proceeds by cajoling or forcing attention and not by explaining the intended goal and by inviting an intelligent and reasonable cooperation (1958, 397; & 2000, p. 422-23) Second, and again, we need to keep the longer and more comprehensive project of philosophical learning constantly in view as readers go through the experiment. In Finding the Mind, the first task is met by the relative brevity of the experiment (it can be completed in a one-semester course), and by drawing our experimental data from the reader’s own experience of language for use as the critical-controlling factor throughout the experiment. ….”introspection” may be understood to mean, not consciousness itself but the process of objectifying the contents of consciousness. Just as we move from the data of sense through inquiry, insight, reflection, judgment, to statements about sensible things, so too we move from the data of consciousness through inquiry, understanding, reflection judgment, to statements about conscious subjects and their operations. That, of course, is just what we are doing and inviting the reader to do at the present time. But the reader will do it, not by looking inwardly, but by recognizing in our expressions the objectification of his subjective experience. (Lonergan, 1972, pp. 8-9) The second task is met by the constant foreshadowing and invitation in the text towards further study and self-examination provided for in the appendixes, references, and in the unique treatment and structure of the text. (The text’s structure is similar to this paper and to a webpage where clicking on the blue print takes you to deeper sections of the text.) As pedagogy, then, the experiment’s relative brevity makes it appropriate for formal classroom use. (See Appendix 8) Section 4—Demonstration If there is time, I will give a brief demonstration of the experiment developed in Finding the Mind. References Crowe, F. E. (2002). The future: Charting the unknown with Lonergan. In F. Lawrence (Ed). Lonergan workshop: Vol. 17. Boston College. King, C. B. (2009). www.educationasimplementation.blogspot.com King, C. B. (2009). Chapter 3, The Gaps. http://findingthemind3.blogspot.com Lonergan, B. J. F. (1958). Insight, a study of human understanding. New York: Philosophical Library. Lonergan, B. J. F. (2000). Collected works of Bernard Lonergan: Insight. F. E. Crowe & R. M. Doran (eds.). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Lonergan, B. J. F. (1972). Method in theology. Minneapolis: Winston Press, Inc. McShane, P. (2009). Field Nocturnes CanTower 47: (http://www.philipmcshane.ca). Morelli, M., & Morelli, E. (1997) (Eds). The Lonergan reader. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Ornstein, A. C. & Hunkins, F. P. (Eds.) (1998 & 2004). Curriculum—Foundations, principles, and issues. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon. Piscitelli, E. J. (1977). Language and method in the philosophy of religion: A critical study of the development of the philosophy of Bernard Lonergan. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington, DC. Piscitelli, E. J. (1985). The fundamental attitudes of the liberally educated person: Foundational dialectics. In Fred Lawrence (Ed.), The Lonergan workshop: Vol. 5. (pp. 289-342). Chico, CA: Chico Press. [Later referred to as The Foundations of Philosophy: The Person—Education and Dialectics.] Retrieved: April 17, 2008. http://mysite.verizon.net/thelogos/Dialectic.pdf) APPENDICES for Bridging the Gulf--Education as Implementation Section 1, Appendix 1: The Historical Context Let us give only a brief treatment of this context by considering “the gap” (one of several) that was exposed during the scientific revolution. Twentieth century philosophy and theology inherited this upside-down, or right-side up, state of affairs, depending on your view; and Lonergan gave treatment to it in his Insight and other works (1958, pp. 732-33; & 2000, pp. 754-55). So that no matter what problems of communication are present in Lonergan’s work, that post-enlightenment context—the “gap” where the problem of knowledge lives--already puts philosophy and theology, and Lonergan, trying to come in from the cold of marginalization to meet with the (so often considered) more legitimate and critical fields of study. The problem of knowledge emerged from within the differentiating, reversing, and conflicting movements of the scientific revolution, or from a change of direction and emphasis in vector-flow—from tradition and its Doctrine-as-knowledge from-above, to knowledge as developed from below and supported by a body of evidence, regardless of tradition or religious proclamations. The revolution exposed a gap in our thinking and laid bare the question of the knowledge-truth-reality complex and its relationship to doctrine (from above), and to doctrinal, religious, and political authority. The whole project of knowledge needed to be re-thought from bottom to top, as it were, and in terms of the ongoing revolution. Knowledge of anything that wasn't rooted in the natural, physical, or statistical sciences was now irretrievably in a vacuum in-between the two vectoral forces. Clearly knowledge was what the scientist could discover and prove in the laboratory to every one's satisfaction. And even in commonsense practical matters today, we find an “unpleasant ambiguity in an assertion of principle” that is “not coupled with the evidence of fact” (1958, p. 733; 2000, p. 755). In this way, however, it “fell” to the quasi-philosopher of the time, whose field (in part) is knowledge, to now explain what the knowing-knowledge-truth complex really is, as a now-necessary prerequisite for claiming that doctrine is also knowledge. Over time, the lack of forthcoming, unified, and qualified explanations, and the interminable technical arguments, opened the door to the estrangement of philosophy and its various fields, including ethics. (At this writing, ethics is enjoying an albeit pragmatic comeback.) And it opened the door for psychology, logic, and the statistical sciences to at least try to fill the void that is still the real home of philosophical discourse--about meaning and the good, and about objectivity and the knowledge-truth-real complex. (See King, 2009, Blog: Excerpt from Preface). Appendix 2: Camp Mentality We might compare the camp mentality in philosophy and (to a lesser degree) in the human sciences and education with, for instance, Einstein’s theories. Though Einstein’s name is attached to his theories, physicists do not (seemingly arbitrarily) choose another theoretical or conceptually-different camp that treats physics, special relativity, and time, for instance, according to their different and un-inspected foundational viewpoints. So that, in physics, the discoverer’s name commonly follows the theory; whereas in the human sciences, etc., the theories follow the names. Hence, various “camps” of thought have emerged. And many papers and books that take Lonergan’s work as their centerpiece often have “Lonergan” in their titles. Appendix 3: Esoterica Those who have read both of Lonergan’s major works, Insight, A Study of Human Understanding (1958 &; 2000) and Method in Theology (1972), will recognize my reference here to the difference in writing style and delivery between the two works. Whereas Insight is thick, intricate, and cavernous, Method In Theology feels like breathing fresh air, especially after having struggled through Insight with its “in the seventeenth place” esoterica (1958, p. 556; & 2000, p. 579) On the good side, many Lonergan-savvy teachers presently teach in undergraduate secular institutions adapting the work and even using Method in Theology, etc., in variously-named philosophy, theology, and religion courses. Here, teachers may easily convey that any field can benefit from the insights found there, thereby gaining a larger audience for the work. Even so, the question remains whether Method in Theology is accessible for college undergraduates; or for non-theology students involved in special or general studies; or for those new to any sort of philosophical study; or for the easy consideration of administrators in secular colleges and universities. My experience of using this text for such students: It is not. Insight is not always so difficult to read; however, Lonergan wrote Insight with the scientist in mind; for a “sufficiently cultured consciousness;” and for those already familiar with reading philosophical history and its texts. For the teacher looking for cognitional theory, or for the cultured renaissance reader who could benefit greatly from Lonergan’s contributions, alas, Insight is entirely too long and technical (1958, p. xxviii; & 2000, p. 11). Thus, in reading Insight, the reader is asked to grasp a long series of places, “in the twelfth place,” and B-C-D and E before getting to Lonergan’s A. As such, Insight has a more foundational “punch” for the scientist, but is difficult for those who are not scientists; whereas, Method in Theology is a happier read for the teacher, or the literary scholar, or the renaissance reader. Even though Method In Theology offers a more literary style and makes much quicker correlations between the A-B-C’s developed there, it is still not undergraduate material. Appendix 4: No Distinction between Religious/Theological and Philosophical Content Many who would benefit from Lonergan’s work mistakenly regard Lonergan as “only” a Catholic or Christian theologian. With such wrong assumptions of religious or theological intent in mind, the work is seen as not really critical or applicable to the concerns of the more secular-minded reader, or to the critical-theoretical fields, and certainly cannot provide the philosophical underpinnings of fields of study (e.g., through the functional specialties) (1972). Of course we know that Lonergan has a vision of the whole which includes theology (see Insight’s epilogue) as not just another field of study, but as the wherewithal of a comprehensive view from what he means by the higher viewpoint. And of course, Lonergan contributes greatly to religious and theological persons and issues. However, (from my reading of him) he was also quite aware of the ever-present need to open channels of communication to others who would gain first from a philosophical appropriation of transcendental method and the underlying shifts of personal foundational meaning he referred to in terms of various correctives and conversions. In this regard, many writers and websites have not clearly distinguished between religious and philosophical issues. Indeed, such a wrong-headed critique (that Lonergan’s work is uncritical) reveals a tension that rightly exists between secular and religious, if not theological, arenas of thought; and those who understand Lonergan’s meaning will recognize a moment of high irony in such a dismissal. Further, Lonergan was a Jesuit and spent his major intellectual work from within the venue of theological and religious studies. His long-term study of St. Thomas Aquinas is well-known throughout the circles of Lonergan scholars. Moreover, because Lonergan was a major thinker who made major contributions, many from his intellectual milieu have developed their own work around what was basic to his. The upshot of the above, however, is that authors’ writings that emerge from having understood Lonergan’s work are often published in relatively arcane publications in the fields of academic philosophy, theology, and religion, often developed in off-the-beaten-track conferences such as this one where, in most cases, we are preaching to the choir. Also, many writers use the still-unknown “Lonergan” in their book titles; or maintain their religious references there and in their subject matter; or they maintain an esoteric language and presentation equal to or surpassing Lonergan’s own (as in dissertations); or they continue to combine (and confuse) foundational with topical treatment. In any of these cases, and well-written or not, the movement of Lonergan’s contribution through these writers, towards a larger audience of educators and persons of good commonsense, is slow. Appendix 5: Impediments on the Side of the Audience First, under the half-reflective view of such polymorphism, our present project cannot be done critically, on principle. From this lens, only the natural and physical sciences and their related fields, and maybe statistics in some multi-blind studies, can provide authentic data or the methods to approach such data; and consequently the data of these fields are the only data we can be truly critical, unbiased, and scientific about. Second, under other aspects of such polymorphism, some harbor various versions of the view that anything goes. Here, everything is interpreted and keeps changing, and so there is nothing really known, true, or real, except maybe in a fuzzy sort of way. Here, all theorists, scholars, and academicians are “liberal” and are really about ivory towers, overblown-ego, and arbitrariness; and none has a lock on anything save their own hubris, whatsoever, especially in the fields of education and human studies. Such folks have nary a ground, no umbrella, no net, no guide and no practical connection whatsoever with concrete truth or reality, no workable or non-arbitrary vision for the future; and further, they all should stop looking for one. Anything they say, in fact, is just subjective, personal, and sentimental bias; and only a too-soft heart will listen (bleed), and then only out of a similarly ungrounded sense of social indulgence. And paying attention to social amenities or tearful anecdotes can hardly be called “scientific.” Third, and mixed within the above views, are those who think all real and objective knowledge can never have a personal component, or have an intimate dimension and, at the same time, remain objective knowledge. There indeed is a reality, but subjectivity has little or nothing to do with it. Though half-reflective views emerge in different arguments for different reasons, in unreflective living, commonsense ethics rules the day (born of our given fundamental thrust), and it’s a good thing considering the alternatives. Fourth, the view from either assumption is that, though some “big names” are attractive, can write well, and have careers, a philosopher, of all people, will never discover or be able to explain to us in reasonable terms how our studies, our natural science, our ethics, our politics, and our education all fit together and point towards a future. Obvious self-contradictions aside, from either view, if there is a “rock” to build on, no one has found it, given theory to it, or expects anyone to listen if they do; for on principle, it cannot be done (Lonergan, 1972, pp. 19-20). And by the way, there is no rock, but there is only hard science and clouds, and even then we are not really certain. Fifth, dogmatism closes over all half-reflective counter-positions. From closure, we are unwillingness to either take on a long self-development project or to change old and deeply ingrained habits of mind. In fact, we are closed to the project of philosophical development and self-correction that Lonergan offers. It goes without saying that, under the influence of such polymorphic foundations, philosophy as a reflection on those foundations, and on knowledge, etc., is ruled out of court at the start. Ethics, of course, follows suit—it just works for me, or it is a wispy idealized adjunct to the “hard sciences,” carried about in the briefcases of good, worried, but painfully sentimental professors who feel, if they do not understand, the political writing on the wall. On one view, neither philosophy nor ethics is hard science. On another view, neither really matters anyway, so what is the point? As un-scrutinized, our polymorphic assumptions emerge from the half-light of fuzzy thought set up in static cul-de-sacs in the mind; and, more importantly, only one of these assumptions matches the deeper, equally exigent assumptions of scientists or persons of good common sense--assumptions that come into play when they actually move forward in any field of inquiry, whether in concrete human living that is inexorably good, or in building speculative and-or verified theory in any science. As un-scrutinized, what is basic to us continues to work. As far as going forward while performing a philosophical contradiction is concerned, persons who perform such a feat, and who claim to be philosophers, "feat themselves" right out of the argument and the community of persons who are taking seriously their efforts to understand. We need pay as much attention to their self-contradictions as we do to mad-persons. And so we have conflicting sets of assumptions and several lenses to look through. We look through one lens (basic) when we go forward in any field of discourse where knowledge is developed and where things get done. And we look through another lens when we think about what we are doing with our philosophical inheritance in place (self-contradictions, as above). That is, when science and commonsense work well, they do so from employing a right set of assumptions and lenses about the good-knowledge-true-real complex we all live in. It is when we start thinking about our philosophical assumptions, or when we are challenged, that we forget what we already have and work with, and what already works for and in us—rightly in most cases throughout history, and begin to think with our incomplete and-or distorted philosophical inheritance. Our point of course is that getting philosophical attention is not an easy task. Appendix 6: Conclusion to Part 1 At this writing I think it fair to assume that Lonergan’s contribution has not reached the K-12 setting in any systematic way; and I know of no integration of Lonergan’s work in formal K-12 curriculum theory, though I hope I am wrong in this. That being said, and besides fostering the art of self-appropriation-affirmation, the work of a researcher-scholar familiar with transcendental method and surrounding literature is, in part, that of developing a dialectical analysis of present theory in different aspects of curriculum, much of which is good if not fully functional (For example: Ornstein & Hunkins, 2004). For, many in education have broken through their positivist inheritance in fact if not as reflectively philosophical. It remains that such analysis and critique is slow-to-non-existent; and, at the present rate and for years to come, many students will go through the academy without being introduced to the kind of self-knowledge that is now available to us through a full understanding and personal verification of transcendental method with or without a full understanding of its spiritual or religious import. Regardless of his present limited (albeit growing) audience, Lonergan’s contribution is relevant to the larger philosophical project in the academic fields, to cultural studies, and to the foundations of the education of persons. Lonergan clearly knew that his work has vast implications for the foundations of the academy; for the philosophy of education and its various subsets; for cultural studies; for philosophy; and for any variously named departments of study--not to mention for statisticians and scientists involved in studies of the natural-physical world, cognition, and the brain. Also, his work self-consciously reaches beneath and far beyond the sciences and theology, though not beyond the scientist, the theologian and the renaissance reader, as critical thinkers in an increasingly complex world. Section 2 Appendix 7: Comprehensive Self-Understanding as Goal Again, there exists a need to bring the work to education and to add to the increasing body of access-literature written for those who will benefit greatly from being exposed to Lonergan’s many contributions to philosophy, not to mention theology. The theoretical work is seminal, generic, complex, comprehensive, innovative and unique. Precisely because of the sweep of Lonergan’s contributions, they can benefit from the establishment of a clear pedagogical method--a set of stepping-stones--not towards “Lonergan’s theory,” but towards a specified critical-objective, but also quite personal self-understanding for each of us, including both the person of good commonsense and the scientist who fully embraces scientific method and all of its critical canons. Transcendental method is about, and continually points to, such self-understanding: “For self-appropriation of itself is a grasp of transcendental method . . . .” (1972, p. 83). Further, many good writings exist in the vein of mediating Lonergan’s work, e.g., The Lonergan Reader (Morelli, 1997). And many themes have been abstracted from Lonergan’s work and treated separately while maintaining the integrity of the treatise and-or the specific coursework—where the whole of self-appropriation is not the aim. However, the driving question for me still remained: How to isolate and bring the centerpiece of the work--self-appropriation-affirmation, and the pearl of self-reflection--to teachers in a curricular format for education (for my field interest) and an offering to other fields, again, without vulgarizing or telescoping the work, or without writing another book like Insight? Nine years ago, I started with the set of insights--that still holds nine years later—by isolating and developing an abstracted experiment towards consciously and critically coming to know one’s own mind. The relatively brief experiment contains a critically established proof, as it were, of the inner structure and functioning of one’s own mind. However, at that time, and in my naiveté, I expected too much of it—I expected, if not a “single leap,” as it were (p. xxiii & p. 17), at least a better result. Though I wouldn’t call it a vulgarization, the experiment didn’t carry with it the foundational insights that I had naively expected to occur. Appendix 8: Teachers Today, and the Purpose of the Moving Viewpoint Most teachers in my experience have a deep-set but unsaid resonance with the longer journey, and a felt conflict with an over-emphasis on teaching to what I am calling the shorter journey. Many try to serve their deeper sense of what is right and actually teach to the longer journey of understanding, as our students are also given to strive for it. However, much of the policy and practice surrounding the institution of education is on the shorter, telescoped, and should I say vulgarized, track with much pressure to continue on that track. At least for education, that need is to provide a clear pedagogical method that can be used directly in, or transposed into, other knowledge fields. Further, such pedagogy will show how the theory is related to our “sense experience.” The task, then, was to write a text that distinguishes, but also to maintain the relationship between, what I am calling the longer and shorter philosophical journeys. For the reader-experimenter, the task is to at least become aware of the essence of and potential for the longer philosophical journey (suffering through one’s own long and painstaking philosophical development and self-correction) that, generally, are the central themes of Lonergan’s body of work. Thus, the structure of the text must distinguish but also relate (1) a relatively brief experiment and its singular A-Z intent from (2) other more comprehensive and life-qualifying meanings associated with foundational study. Those deeper meanings are about developing our powers of critical self-awareness and understanding and, through that development, increasing our self-knowledge and abilities to self-correct. And those meanings of mind and spirit are potential to occur only in that longer journey, however it is made—Lonergan is speaking of that longer journey in his declaration that he couldn’t deliver Insight in two weeks. Further, as Lonergan states he uses a moving viewpoint in writing his Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (1958 & 2000). He does so because he is not only talking about insights and surrounding cognitional process, but also because he is trying to inspire a set of sometimes-startling insights and changes of horizon to occur in the reader. Thus, he hopes to draw his readers in to a fuller, and intimately personal, self-understanding. The process, hopefully, will supply us with both the philosophical development and the historical correctives that are central to his contribution to philosophical thought and that underlie the self-appropriation/affirmation that is his fundamental aim. Thus, in engaging Insight, we are not merely learning what a particular philosopher thinks, but we are also applying that thought—manifest in a well-developed theory--to our own thought processes and testing our philosophical assumptions as we go through the reading. The hoped-for outcome of moving through a complex text in this way is to inspire gradual growth in reader’s self-understanding and to challenge readers’ present philosophical foundations so that, perhaps, we can slowly develop different “eyes” after having engaged it. Here, I mean by eyes that we already have a set of philosophical lenses through which we “look” and, thus, through which we approach all old and new meaning. Such is the metaphorical meaning of the foundations of a house or the boundaries of a football game. Like anything else, however, these lenses can be our objects of analysis and critique. Such a self-understanding can result in life-changing insights, self-corrections, and formidable changes of horizon and direction. More generally speaking, such reflections can result in our becoming consciously aware of our own deepening of spirit as it occurs. Lonergan’s writings are complex; and they include many references to the inexorably intimate, universal, and concrete; and as Frederick Crowe suggests, they follow a long arch of universal and historical vision (Crowe, 2002, p. 15). Insight, however, is over 800 pages long; and none of Lonergan’s writings are known as “easy reads.” At this time in our philosophical history in academia, the writings are commonly reserved for post-graduate study, unless severely interpreted, abbreviated, or modified from course to course. The insight that I needed to add to the original experiment was this: Anything both short and philosophical must have and show a clearly recognizable context, and it must give proper reference and place to what I have named the longer journey. It must begin by explaining the relationship of the experiment with the experimenter’s “sense experience,” and it must be set in the clear recognition of a field of personal experience and development where deeper insights and self-corrections are understood as potential to all, are the aim, and are overtly invited to occur. Excerpt from Finding the Mind: Preface Bringing Lonergan’s Discovery to a Larger Audience—Problems Anyone who has read a text more than once knows that, with each new reading, the meaning changes, and often increases. Often we can approach a text for the second or third time from a different horizon--a horizon changed for us by the first reading. However, those who have read both of Lonergan’s major works, Insight, A Study of Human Understanding (1958 & 2000) and Method in Theology (1972), will recognize my reference here to the difference in writing style and delivery between the two works. Whereas Insight is thick, intricate, and cavernous, Method In Theology feels like breathing fresh air, especially after having struggled through Insight with its “in the seventeenth place” esoterica. For example, in his chapter in Insight, “Metaphysics as Dialectic,” Lonergan relates: . . . let us suppose that a writer proposes to communicate some insight (A) to a reader. Then by an insight (B) the writer will grasp the reader’s habitual accumulation of insights (C); by a further insight (D) he will grasp the deficiencies in insight (E) that must be made up before the reader can grasp the insight (A); finally, the writer must reach a practical set of insights (F) that will govern his verbal flow, the shaping of his sentences, their combination into paragraphs, the sequence of paragraphs in chapters and of chapters in books. Clearly, this practical insight (F) differs notably from the insight (A) to be communicated. It is determined by the insight (A) as its principal objective. But it is also determined by the insight (B) which settles both what the writer need not explain and, no less, the resources of language on which he can rely to secure effective communication. Further, it is determined by the insight (D) which fixes a subsidiary goal that has to be attained if the principal goal is to be reached. Finally, the expression will be a failure in the measure that insights (B) and (D) miscalculate the habitual development (C) and the relevant deficiencies (E) of the anticipated reader. . . .It follows, then, that properly speaking expression is not true or false. (1958, p. 556 & 2000, p. 579) It is not always like this in Insight. However, Lonergan wrote Insight with the scientist in mind; for a “sufficiently cultured consciousness;” and for those already familiar with reading philosophical history and its texts. For the teacher looking for cognitional theory, or for the cultured renaissance reader who could benefit greatly from Lonergan’s contributions, alas and however, Insight is entirely too long, technical and esoteric [8] (1958, p. xxviii & 2000, p. 11). Thus, in reading Insight, the reader is asked to understand B-C-D and E before getting to Lonergan’s A. Whereas Method In Theology offers a more literary style and makes much quicker correlations between the A-B-C’s developed there and the personal interior of the reader. As such, Insight has a more foundational “punch” for the scientist, but is difficult for those who are not scientists; whereas, Method in Theology is a happier read for the teacher, or the literary scholar, or the renaissance reader. The further problem with Method in Theology, however, is that it was apparently written explicitly for theologians; or at least an unknowing reader must presume so by a cursory review of the book’s title and by its many references to theology and theologians. Moreover, many college and university teachers presently teach from the point of view of having understood Lonergan’s contributions. For instance, “Lonerganian” teachers in undergraduate secular institutions may order Method in Theology for their students in variously-named philosophy of religion courses. After doing so, teachers may easily convey that, in this work, Lonergan’s more comprehensive philosophical insights are transformed and adapted to theology; but that any field will benefit from such transformation and adaptation. In this way, savvy teachers can mediate Lonergan’s contribution to philosophy-proper through the use of Method in Theology, and direct students to relate it to different concerns thereby gaining a larger audience for the work. Even so, the question remains whether Method in Theology is accessible for college undergraduates; or for non-theology students involved in special or general studies; or for those new to any sort of philosophical study; or for the easy consideration of administrators in secular colleges and universities. My experience of using this text for such students: It is not. Regardless of his present limited (albeit growing) audience, Lonergan’s contribution is to the larger philosophical project in the academic fields, to the cultural studies, and to the foundations of the education of persons. Lonergan clearly knew that his work has vast implications for the foundations of the academy; for the philosophy of education and its various subsets; for cultural studies; for philosophy; and for any variously named departments of study--not to mention for statisticians and scientists involved in studies of the natural-physical world, cognition, and the brain. Also, his work self-consciously reaches beneath and far beyond the sciences and theology, though not beyond the scientist, the theologian and the renaissance reader, as critical thinkers in an increasingly complex world. In fact, however, it is not so easy to leave the subject outside one's calculations .... (1958, p. 408; & 2000, p. 433) Thus, I appreciate greatly Lonergan’s genius, his efforts at creating a dialogue with scientists, his forays into the philosophy of education, and his great contribution to method in theology. However, I also recognize the implied limitation in readership that Insight’s esoterica and Method’s theological references present. Precisely because of the creative import of his work, it needs to “get out there” in ways that transcend both problems in appealing to a more general reader-access. Further, Lonergan was a Jesuit and spent his major intellectual work from within the venue of theological and religious studies. His long-term study of St. Thomas Aquinas is well-known throughout the circles of Lonergan scholars. Moreover, because Lonergan was a major thinker who made major contributions, many from his intellectual milieu have developed their own work around what was basic to his. However, the writing emerging from these works is often published in relatively arcane publications in the fields of academic philosophy, theology, and religion. Also, many writers use the still-unknown “Lonergan” in their book titles; or maintain their religious references there and in their subject matter; or they maintain an esoteric language and presentation equal to or surpassing Lonergan’s own. In any of these cases, and well-written or not, the movement of Lonergan’s contribution through these writers towards a larger audience of educators and persons of good commonsense is slow. Also, many who would benefit from Lonergan’s work mistakenly regard Lonergan as “only” a Catholic or Christian theologian. Some might argue that, though remarkably intelligent, after all, Lonergan is speaking only from a belief, faith, doctrinal, ideological or classicist set of views. If the critique is true, and by secular and critical-methodological standards, such arguments would rightly render Lonergan’s work irrelevant to all but the most devoted of religious followers. Indeed, such a critique reveals a tension that rightly exists between secular and religious domains. However, this critique of Lonergan’s work is fundamentally wrongheaded, and those who understand Lonergan’s meaning will recognize a moment of high irony in such a dismissal. As such, a brief description of the sweep of Lonergan’s contribution is appropriate to this section of the present work: Though Lonergan was indeed a Jesuit, he was also a philosopher of the first order. As such, we can read his work from a philosophical point of view without taking into consideration his religious foundations, one way or the other. That is, his work is fully critical. Further, as a philosopher, Lonergan was a critical generalist who gathers in the insights from a long history of philosophical thought and brings them into view under a creative and critical venue. Thus, transcendental method fully embraces science and its empirical method—by defining knowledge in its most critical-empirical way and by methodologically clarifying, and setting up the conditions for us to verify, the empirical ground of all knowledge fields. That ground can be found in the actual structure and dynamism of human cognition—in everyone’s, and especially yours, which is the fundamental focus of this work. Further, it can be found in the actual historical unfolding and development of human knowledge (1958, p. 387; & 2000, p. 412). Thus, if we begin from the point of view of Catholic scholarship and Christian education, Lonergan’s contribution is to theology and to the foundations of religion. This contribution includes a critical view of classicist thought, ideology, doctrine, logic, and the philosophical dimension of theological studies. Here, the philosophical assumptions of the theologian are called into question and laid open for self-critical review (or what we will refer to as foundational review). Therefore, Lonergan’s work explicitly requires of the theologian a critical openness towards, and active critique of, the theologian’s own philosophical inheritance (their intentionality analysis and foundational review), their own minds and methods, their own biases, and the underpinnings of all specific church doctrine. For Lonergan, then, philosophy provides the critical, edifying, negative-dialectic for theological and for religious studies. Far from portraying philosophy as the “handmaiden of religion,” this work portrays philosophy as the empirically verifiable source of critique for the theologian and for theology. Also, Lonergan did not place himself or his work outside of such a critique. On the other hand, and from the point of view of secular education and the history of thought, Lonergan’s contribution is to the critical philosophy underpinning all domains of thought, both personal and scientific, and both writ-small and writ-large. Here, Lonergan is in communication with the philosophical tradition as a whole, and with the various schools of thought that have emerged from the one cultural root, including those in the philosophy of history. Considering again Lonergan’s writings, Method in Theology holds philosophical insights that are highly relevant to all thinkers in all knowledge fields. However, again, those insights remain obscured by the book’s title, its intended audience of theologians, and its example of and adaptation to theology. Thus, many highly intelligent thinkers, who may have neither “formulated nor scrutinized” their own sets of assumptions, can fail to be introduced to a body of work that provides a systematic and critical avenue for such scrutiny and formulation. On the other hand, though Insight is written for the scientifically minded person, it is not exactly a weekend read. That being said, throughout Insight we find a continued formulation and reference to the personal scrutinizing experiment of self-reference for any thinker in any knowledge field: To affirm knowing it is useless to peer inside, for the dynamic pattern is to be found not in this or that act but in the unfolding of mathematics, empirical science, common sense, and philosophy; in that unfolding must be grasped the pattern of knowing and, if one feels inclined to doubt that the pattern really exists, then one can try the experiment of attempting to escape experience, to renounce intelligence in inquiry, to desert reasonableness in critical reflection. (Lonergan, 1958, p. 416 & 2000, p. 441) In all of his writings Lonergan rejects an arbitrary dismissal of, or an arbitrary acceptance of, transcendental or general empirical method. Further, Lonergan invokes the present disunity in-and-between all knowledge fields; and he relates a misunderstanding of the experience-of-inquiry as cause for the present disarray in our foundations of thought. As a critical approach to that disarray, a thorough engagement with Method in Theology finds, first, transcendental method and self-appropriation identified as not only in and for theologians but also in and for all persons (writ-small). Second, we find that Lonergan developed the functional specialties as an expression of an heuristic structure of being--as an explicit metaphysics--drawn from an analysis of transcendental method and from its match with the unfolding of human knowledge in history. As such, he presents a clear view of the philosophical underpinnings of all knowledge fields, institutions, and cultures (writ-large) (1972, Chaps. 5-14). Moreover, again, such functional specialties are far from arbitrarily formed. Rather, they emerge from the data available for review of conscious structure: For self-appropriation is of itself a grasp of transcendental method, and that grasp provides one with the tools not only for an analysis of common sense procedures, but also for the differentiation of the sciences and the construction of their methods. (1972, p. 83) The work is bold, but bold is what we need. Further, included in the knowledge fields, of course, is the integrative field of the philosophy of education, as well as curriculum development and classroom teaching where we come into communication with the political, social, ethical and spiritual dimensions of consciousness and culture. Third, beyond the import of self-appropriation on individual persons, and beyond the import of the functional specialties on the unity of all knowledge fields and institutions, transcendental method is a general theory that points to conscious structure as a trans-cultural base. Such a base is universal, verifiable in everyone and every culture, and imports on all persons, culture, and history (1972, pp. 282-3). Thus, again, Lonergan draws into theory the underlying base and ground of all knowledge fields and cultures. He develops that ground from the broad outlines of all human understanding; and that understanding is rooted in the dynamism of our own cognitional structure. From that theoretical understanding, we can call up our own conscious structure for its analysis and verification; and indeed, that calling-up is what the present work is fundamentally about. As such, we finally can include ourselves in our notions of objectivity without sinking into a quagmire of "mere subjectivity" from which there is "no exit." Further, those who spend any time with Lonergan’s work, as a rule, come away with the right notion that this person was, indeed, a first-rate philosopher; that he addresses the long-arch of human history and the place of science in it in post-modern life; and that his work is yet to be felt in the world in ways that it should be, and most probably will be. The above is only a brief description of the sweep of an otherwise thorough-going, creative, and critical development in 20th century philosophical thought--thought that I hope will have great developmental and corrective influence in the 21st century. Copyright © 2009 Catherine B. King